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Abstract:  
 
Purpose: The aim of this article is to analyse legal solutions determining the principles of 
undertaking and performing pharmacy activities in Poland, with particular emphasis on the 
importance of these solutions to guarantee the public health protection in terms of theory of 
state interference in the economy.   
Design/Methodology/Approach: The article uses the method of analysis of legal regulation 
and the descriptive method. 
Findings: The object of pharmacy’s activities is the provision of pharmaceutical services 
that remain in the domain of practising the profession of pharmacist as a profession of public 
trust. The provisions of Polish Pharmaceutical Law, shaping the principles of rationing 
pharmaceutical activities in Poland, and thus determining the subjective structure of the 
pharmacy market, have undergone a particular change, which entered into force on June 25, 
2017, giving rise to polarization of participants in the pharmacy market for entrepreneurs.   
Practical Implications: Considering the existing differentiation of the pharmaceutical 
activities model, it is necessary to assess the legal conditions of the public health protection 
guarantee in the field of the entrepreneur's social interest. This assessment should concern 
both running a pharmacy by a non-pharmacist and an entrepreneur with the right to practice 
as a pharmacist. Recognizing the close correlation between the economic objective and the 
public objective of the pharmacy activities, the question should also be asked about the 
significant changes in Pharmaceutical Law aimed at strengthening the pharmacist's position 
as an important participant in the market of pharmacy services. 
Originality/Value: The implementation of the public health care facility function by the 
generally accessible pharmacy is in line with the context of public health protection 
guarantee in the field of the functioning of the pharmacy market, both in terms of the 
principles of undertaking pharmacy operations as well as legal solutions that determine the 
pharmacy management model. 
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The pharmaceutical service is a special type of benefit aimed at the sphere of basic 
personal human rights: health and life, covered by the qualifications of practising the 
profession of pharmacist as a profession of public trust. In the socially most 
important categories of pharmaceutical services, this benefit remains in the sphere of 
pharmacies' activities. According to Art. 86 par. 2 of the Act of 6 September 2001 
Pharmaceutical Law (consolidated text Journal of Laws of 2020 item 944, as 
amended – hereinafter: Pharmaceutical Law or a.p.l) the name of the pharmacy is 
reserved exclusively for the place of rendering pharmaceutical services, including: 
 
• issuing medicinal products and medical devices, specified in separate 
regulations; 
• preparation of prescription drugs within 48 hours from the submission of a 
prescription by the patient, and in case of prescription for a prescription drug 
containing narcotic drugs or labelled "to be issued immediately" - within 4 
hours; 
• preparation of pharmacy drugs; 
• providing information on medicinal products and medical devices. 
 
The provision of a pharmaceutical service in the field of services of a generally 
accessible pharmacy remains subject to the rules of economic activity covered by the 
constitutional principle of economic activity freedom, which due to the special 
character and social significance of pharmacies' activities for the public interest, 
understood as public health protection, remains legally restricted in a significant 
way. The admissibility of this type of restriction is indicated in Art. 22 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Poland (Journal of Laws of 1997 No. 78, item 483, 
as amended), according to which the restriction of freedom of economic activity is 
permissible only by law and only for important public reasons. The state's rationing 
of undertaking pharmacy activity by granting permissions to operate a pharmacy by 
the authorities of the State Pharmaceutical Inspection is considered to be the most 
significant indication of the restriction of pharmaceutical activities.  
 
According to Art. 99 par. 1 a.p.l. a generally accessible pharmacy can be run only on 
the basis of the obtained permission. Carrying out pharmacy activities as part of 
running generally accessible pharmacy is characterized by a specific dualism of 
objectives, i.e. an economic objective and a public objective. In economic terms, a 
generally accessible pharmacy is an enterprise, i.e. in accordance with art. 551 of the 
Act of 23 April 1964 – Civil Code (consolidated text Journal of Laws of 2019, item 
1145, as amended – hereinafter: C.c.) an organized set of intangible and tangible 
assets intended for conducting economic activity. In the above approach, a generally 
accessible pharmacy is an economic unit whose pursuit is determined by market 
mechanisms subjected to a certain scope of regulation of public authority organs and 
aimed at achieving the expected economic effect in the form of profit.  




The generally accessible pharmacy activity perceived in this way, however, remains 
determined and limited by the overriding and statutory public objective, that is 
public health protection. According to Art. 86 par. 1 a.p.l. the pharmacy is a public 
health protection facility, in which the entitled persons provide in particular 
pharmaceutical services, which gives the indicated public objective priority over the 
economic objective, thus giving the economic conditions and objectives of generally 
accessible pharmacy activities a subsidiary character. The indicated dualism of the 
objectives of a generally accessible pharmacy, detailing the absolute priority of the 
pharmacy's objective of public health protection, makes the question legitimate 
about guarantee of public health protection in the sphere of functioning of the 
pharmacy market, both in the context of polarization of the nature and qualifications 
of business entities running pharmacies, as well as the pharmacy management model 
in terms of Pharmaceutical Law regulations and judicial decisions. Considering the 
indicated directing activities of generally accessible pharmacies on the sphere of the 
public interest protection with simultaneous limitation and subsidiarity of the 
individual entrepreneur's interest, the above considerations should be referred to the 
theory of state interference in the economy. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
In the scope of analysing the admissibility of state interference in market 
mechanisms, the existing relationships between transaction costs and market failure 
conditions are important, to which mainstream economics include market strength, 
external effects, public goods, and imperfect information. Asymmetry, distortion, 
and interference of information lead to the problem of knowledge about private 
benefits and costs, i.e. they cause external effects and their special cases in the form 
of public goods. These factors also raise transaction costs that prevent the solution of 
the problem of external effects through a private contract, which creates the need for 
state intervention, however, provided that the benefits of undertaking this 
intervention outweigh its costs. The concept of transaction cost can be used both to 
prove premises about market failure and premises about government failure, as 
restrictions on private contracts are strongly dependent on the quality of formal 
regulations for which public authorities are responsible. Transaction costs treated as 
operating costs of the economic system are a more general category than the 
category of market failure, because in some cases they constitute a blockage for the 
emergence of markets (Arrow, 1969). 
 
Therefore, the reason for state interference in the economy can be defined as the 
inability of private markets to supply certain goods in general or in the most 
expected way, which is connected with the problem of insufficient supply of certain 
products or services (Pearce, 1992). Market imperfections are often interpreted as 
situations in which decisions taken by market participants do not lead to maximizing 
the benefits of the most efficient resource allocation. Market imperfections appear 
when the market system, unlimited and left to free mechanisms, does not lead to 
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optimal allocation of resources, appropriate prices or production, generating socially 
unacceptable results (Wampler and Touchton, 2019). From the point of view of the 
analysis of state aid institutions, the following market failures are of the greatest 
importance (Meiklejohn, 1999): market power, external effects, increasing returns to 
scale, public goods, merit goods, imperfect or asymmetric information, institutional 
rigidities, imperfect mobility of production’s factors, frictional problems of 
adjustment to changes in markets, and subsidization by foreign competitors. 
 
Market power is associated with imperfect competition, and especially with the 
existence of monopolies in some markets, infringement, or distortion of competition. 
The abuse of market power means a situation in which one or more entities can 
influence the price system or level of production. As a result of the fact that entities 
operate in an imperfectly competitive or even monopolized market, they can thus 
acquire a more privileged market position, which in consequence leads to 
inefficiency of the allocation system and higher prices (Strebel, Kubler, and 
Marcinkowski, 2019). 
 
In many cases, the market mechanism is distorted by external effects in the form of 
social benefits and costs that are related to the fact that the activities of market 
participants affect external third parties, i.e. persons other than direct producers or 
consumers (Neven and Verouden, 2008). The effects of positive external effects 
(benefits) and negative external effects (costs) are borne by third parties and on both 
the consumer and producer side they are not offset by the price of the goods. 
Positive external effects are associated with the free-rider problem and occur when 
entities use the activities of third parties without incurring any costs. In turn, 
negative external effects occur when third parties bear the costs associated with the 
activities of other entities (e.g. environmental pollution). This means that the 
production of such goods by enterprises does not guarantee the fulfilment of the 
condition of maximizing benefits, which makes it necessary for the state to provide 
these goods due to the lack of profitability of their production from the point of view 
of individual producers. Premises for insufficient supply of certain products or 
services include the inability to allocate private benefits and costs, the difference 
between social and private benefits, and the existence of benefits and costs also 
affecting entities other than those directly involved.  
 
In such a situation, state intervention is justified by the need to stimulate the desired 
allocation of resources and a fair distribution of the costs of goods that are socially 
important and occur on a sufficiently large scale. In addition, public aid will be 
acceptable if the effect of support granted from public funds is a surplus of social 
benefits over private ones due to the phenomenon of diffusion, i.e. the "spreading" 
of benefits outside the group of direct beneficiaries (Kolstad and Wiig, 2019). 
 
Certain markets may also be inefficient due to the character and nature of broadly 
understood public goods, which are characterized by the inability to exclude anyone 




from their consumption and lack of competition, which means that consumption by a 
given entity does not violate the consumer's abilities of other entities (Stiglitz, 2000). 
The manifestations of market failure that result from the existence of public goods 
is, on the one hand, the insufficient supply of public goods, as they do not allow 
economic efficiency to be achieved, and on the other hand it is a "free-rider 
problem", which results from limited possibility of exclusion (Kleider, 2018). Lack 
of exclusion in the case of public goods or limited possibility of exclusion in the 
case of merit goods mean that private entities do not tend to provide them (Font, 
Smith, Galais, and Alarcon, 2018). A shortage or even lack of such products and 
services would, however, result in the loss of social benefits, which gives grounds 
for justifying state interference in the economy (Kasper and Streit, 1998). 
 
In the perfect competition model, market participants have excellent information 
(Holzinger and Knill, 2005). In fact, however, this information is often imperfect, 
which means that entities have different information, and some market participants 
may have better information than others (Midtbø, 2018). This imperfection may 
result from incomplete information, lack of access, incorrect transmission, but also 
from the occurrence of the phenomenon of uncertainty and risk or the problem of 
information asymmetry. Asymmetry and distorted information mean that prices do 
not reflect the real value of goods and services (Ferreira da Silva and Costa, 2019).  
 
Empirically it was proved by G. Akerlof by analysing the used car market, where 
due to incomplete information on product quality, both valuable products and low-
quality products have similar prices, which ultimately causes defective goods to 
dominate in the market (Akerlof, 1970). Akerlof, referring to the law of Copernicus-
Gresham about "money spoilage", described the displacement of inferior goods in 
favour of poor quality goods as negative selection, which describes the interaction 
between the difference in the quality of goods and the uncertainty regarding this 
quality. This means that prices do not provide information between market 
participants that guarantees the selection of products and services corresponding to 
the offered price and decisions regarding the purchase of specific goods may be 
incorrect (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2011).  
 
To indicate the asymmetry of information as a premise for market failure, economic 
theory puts an additional condition, i.e. separation of ownership from control. 
Relationships regarding the behaviour of entities in this case are explained by the 
agency's theory pointing to the relationships between the "agent" and "principal" that 
arise when one party (agent) takes action on behalf of another party (principal). In 
the principal-agent relationship, the information that is only available to the principal 
plays a determining role, and the relationship itself consists in delegating the 
principal's powers to the agent. Therefore, it is a contract in which one entity 
transfers part of their rights to another, performing services on behalf of the former, 
which is the most common codification of the ways of social interaction (Ross, 
1973; 1979). In addition, moral hazard may appear in the principal-agent 
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relationship as a result of information asymmetry. This will happen when the agent 
acting on behalf of the principal has more information about their actions and 
intentions, and the principal is not able to completely control the agent who can 
make risky and incorrect decisions from the principal's point of view. Therefore, 
moral hazard can result from a situation in which decision makers do not bear the 
full consequences of these behaviours, hence the actions taken are less cautious and 
riskier. The moral hazard can be interpreted as behavior that is characterized by a 
high propensity to take risks in the belief that any consequences of the decisions 
taken will not be borne at all or will be incurred by another entity, and the potential 
benefits of these decisions will show high rates of return. 
 
Consequently, the symptoms of information asymmetry are: 1) negative selection, 
which occurs when, due to a lack of information about a good with greater usability, 
a good with less usability is chosen (the example of the used car market mentioned 
above), 2) the opportunism of the agent that occurs when the one with the 
information advantage in order to maximize their own benefits does not provide the 
principal with adequate information (e.g. due to the employee's information 
advantage over the employer as to the value of work and actual effort, similar 
remuneration may be paid to both valuable and unreliable or not very competitive 
employees), 3) the danger of abuse, which refers to the situation in which an entity, 
having more knowledge and not bearing the full costs of their decisions, acts in a 
manner detrimental to other market participants.  
 
For example, too high interest rate on a bank credit attracts unreliable customers 
assuming non-payment of debt in advance, which causes banks to reduce interest 
rates in order to lower the repayment barrier and when the demand for money 
increases, the necessity to limit the credits granted arises, i.e. the reduction of money 
supply (Stiglitz, 2002). The task of the state should be to influence the cause and 
reduce information asymmetry. State intervention is justified because there is a 
sufficiently large scale and weight of market failure, the inability to ensure the 
supply of specific goods by the market, and the state has a greater ability to create 
effective incentives and to apply a mechanism of coercion to suppliers in the field of 
publishing reliable information about the offer. In addition, public institutions have 
more complete knowledge and capacity to coordinate the market than individual 
market participants (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986).  
 
When analysing the problem of market failure, the main sources of its imperfections 
include the lack of institutional rigidities, which is evident, for example, in the field 
of legislation, low and imperfect mobility of production’s factors, and providing 
justification for restructuring processes frictional problems of adjustment to changes 
in markets and subsidization by foreign competitors (Ismer and Piotrowski, 2018). 
In addition, among the main manifestations of the inefficiency of the market 
mechanism, in addition to market strength, positive and negative external effects, the 
occurrence of public goods and the imperfections of the information, one can also 




point to the need to redistribute income in society, the emergence of economic 
imbalance associated with the phenomenon of inflation, unemployment or a decrease 
in production or market shortages. Market failure may also be caused by problems 
with the coordination of activities of different participants in such a market, where 
the costs of concluding contracts, uncertainty as to the result of cooperation and 
network effects prevent the effective preparation or even the conclusion of 
contractual agreements, thus leading to inefficiently low levels of coordination and 
production.  
 
The literature indicates that coordination problems can occur mainly in the 
mechanism for setting technological standards, in the case of transport infrastructure 
or in the field of innovation (David, 2002). The essence of this mechanism is the 
market selection of a good characterized by not more perfect technology and 
preferred parameters, but a good that is more popular. This means that the preferred 
standard is not technologically more perfect, but more common, which is the main 
manifestation of market failure in the perspective of external effects of the network. 
In such a situation, the justification for public intervention is the state's ability to 
coordinate the market in order to slow down the adoption of the standard and 
provide reliable information about the technology, stimulate a standard change for 
more perfect and protect consumers and enterprises with a weaker market position 
against monopoly by anti-monopoly regulations and case law. 
 
Given that the existence of market failure is a condition without which it is difficult 
for Member States to justify the granting of state aid, it should be clearly 
emphasized that a situation in which an enterprise is unable to undertake specific 
actions without state aid does not necessarily imply the existence of market failure. 
This happens when the enterprise's decision not to invest in a low-profitable project, 
or in a region with low demand or low cost competitiveness, does not have to be the 
result of market failure, but on the contrary - it can be a sign of a properly 
functioning market (Kemmerling, 2010). It cannot be assumed that aid aimed at 
increasing production or lowering prices can be justified by market failure, because 
overcapacity or excessive consumption may be inefficient from the point of view of 
market operation or even harmful to the economy and society as a whole.  
 
The existence of a market failure can only be considered if it would not be possible 
to achieve an effective result alone by market forces without state aid. This principle 
was referred to by R. Coase, who argued that market failures resulting from external 
effects may not always be the reason for state intervention, because each party, using 
them or affected by them, can freely negotiate with others to remove these effects 
(Coase, 1960). In this case, Coase raised the important issue of the impact of 
external effects and the resulting social costs, noting the importance of property 
rights and transaction costs. Coase's theorem assumes that the use of clearly defined 
and explicitly specified property rights for markets in which external effects occur 
allows entities to negotiate lower costs, thus transaction costs are insignificant. As a 
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result, the allocation of resources will be effective, because only in a situation where 
transaction costs are high and thus limit the ability of entities to make mutually 
beneficial transactions, the market allocation of resources is disturbed by the transfer 
of property rights, and state regulation can reduce these costs. However, one should 
also consider the situation when the introduction of regulation may limit the benefits 
of transaction, if this regulation imposes higher costs on market participants. This 
means that state interventionism is effective only when there are transaction costs 
and the costs resulting from the need to adapt to regulations do not outweigh the 
benefits of regulated behaviour. 
 
Coase's new approach to the problem of social and private production costs leads to 
modification of conclusions regarding the state's involvement in the economy. He 
undermines the assumptions on which A.C. Pigou analysis was based regarding the 
discrepancy between social and private cost, and consequently weakens the 
arguments justifying state interference in the market mechanism in the event of 
negative external effects. Negative external effects cannot be a determinant of state 
interventionism if they are considered as a problem of choice in conditions of 
scarcity of resources. This thesis implied that in the absence of transaction costs, 
negotiations taking place as part of the exchange process, which is understood as the 
exchange of property rights between entities or the transfer of legal rights, lead to 
maximization of prosperity, which occurs regardless of the distribution of 
responsibility for external effects. Free market allocation of resources is therefore 
justified when there are no transaction costs, which in relation to reality is a purely 
theoretical assumption.  
 
Therefore, the so-called Coase's theorem should not be equated with the statement 
that state interference in economic processes must not lead to an increase in 
prosperity, but rather with the statement that the effectiveness of state 
interventionism should not be presupposed in advance, because it entails costs that 





The aim of this article is to analyse legal solutions determining the principles of 
undertaking and performing pharmacy activities in Poland, with particular emphasis 
on the importance of these solutions to guarantee the public health protection in 
terms of theory of state interference in the economy. The article uses the method of 
analysis of legal regulation and the descriptive method. 
 
4. Research Results and Discussion 
 
4.1 Duality of the Position of Participants in the Pharmacy Market 




When considering the guarantee of public health protection in the sphere of the 
functioning of the pharmaceutical market, it is necessary first of all to indicate the 
rules and limitations of undertaking pharmacy activities as a determinant of the 
ownership structure of the pharmacies market in Poland. Undertaking pharmacy 
activities remains conditioned by the verification of the implementation of the 
conditions formulated by the provisions of the Pharmaceutical Law and the 
specification of the right to run a pharmacy by a given entrepreneur, made in the 
form of a decision by a provincial pharmaceutical inspector who is a local 
government administration authority. The legal principles of undertaking pharmacy 
operations in Poland have changed fundamentally in 2017 under the Act of 7 April 
2017 amending the Act – Pharmaceutical Law (Journal of Laws of 2017, item 1015 
– hereinafter referred to as: a.a.p.l.) which entered into force entered into force on 
June 25, 2017. The indicated change in the provisions of the Pharmaceutical Law 
was aimed at the appreciation of the pharmacist's position as a participant in the 
pharmacy market, including in particular through the conditioning granting 
permission to operate a pharmacy from having the right to practice as a pharmacist 
by the person applying for its issue (or by each partner of the applicant company). 
According to Art. 99 par. 4 a.p.l. the right to obtain a permission for running a 
generally accessible pharmacy is acquired by: 
 
• a pharmacist holding the right to practice, as referred to in Art. 4 and Art. 4b 
of the Act of 19 April 1991 on Pharmaceutical Chambers (consolidated text 
Journal of Laws of 2019, item 1419, as amended), running a sole 
proprietorship; 
• a general partnership or a professional partnership whose subject of activity 
is solely the management of pharmacies, and in which associates (partners) 
are only pharmacists with the right to practice. 
 
The above requirement makes it impossible to grant permission to operate a 
pharmacy to other entities, however, pursuant to Art. 2 par. 2 a.a.p.l. permissions for 
running generally accessible pharmacies issued before the Act comes into force shall 
remain valid. The indicated change, referred to in the public discourse as a 
"pharmacy for a pharmacist", is in essence a highly expected change.  
 
Having regard to the supremacy of the pharmacy's implementation of the objective 
of protecting public health in relation to the achievement of the economic objective, 
pursuing the pharmaceutical market's determination by pharmacists as sole owners 
of newly-opened pharmacies should be considered justified and consistent with the 
assumptions of the public health protection guarantee in the sphere of functioning of 
the pharmacy market. The importance of a pharmacist as an important participant of 
the pharmaceutical market not only in the area of professional activities, but also in 
the sphere of economic activity, cannot be overestimated in the context of the 
pharmacist's importance as a guarantor of public health protection. 
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The indicated change in the principles of undertaking pharmacy operations is not a 
change of law expressed through an autonomously shaped effect. This change is 
conditioned by the total of additional statutory regulations and pharmacist's 
restrictions on undertaking pharmacy activities, the content and importance of which 
significantly shapes the overall assessment and the dimension of public health 
protection.  
 
First of all, it should be pointed out that, in accordance with Art. 99 par. 4 a.p.l., a 
pharmacist seeking to undertake pharmacy activities is obliged to take it in one of 
the forms of economic activity indicated by the legislator, i.e. in the form of: 1) sole 
proprietorship, 2) general partnership or 3) professional partnership. What is 
important, the above restriction does not apply to entrepreneurs who obtained the 
permission for running pharmacies (or at least have applied for this permission) 
before the Pharmaceutical Law amendment came into force, i.e. before June 25, 
2017. These entrepreneurs remain entitled to perform pharmacy activities in forms 
relevant to their current activities, including in the form of a limited partnership, 
limited liability company and joint-stock company.  
 
The indicated distinction of permissible forms of conducting pharmacy operations 
may result in significant polarization of the participants of the pharmaceutical 
market to entities authorized to perform this activity in market-more profitable 
forms, both in the area of financing operations and responsibility for liabilities and to 
entities authorized to perform this activity in forms that are less economically 
favourable. It should be emphasized that the performance of pharmacy activities in 
each of the currently permissible forms of such activities means full economic 
liability for the entrepreneur, including personal property. For example, in the case 
of conducting business activity in the form of a general partnership, in accordance 
with Art. 22 § 2 of the Act of 15 September 2000 Code of Commercial Companies 
(uniform text Journal of Laws of 2020 item 1526 – hereinafter: C.c.c.), each 
shareholder is liable for the company's obligations without limitation with all their 
assets jointly and severally with the other partners and with the company, subject to 
art. 31 § 1 C.c.c., according to which the creditor of the company may execute the 
property of a partner in the event that the execution of the company's assets proves 
to be ineffective (subsidiary liability of the partner). 
 
Recognizing the legislator's desire to limit the forms of undertaking pharmaceutical 
activity to forms guaranteeing effective exclusion of non-pharmacists from its scope 
and exclusion of their influence on the entrepreneur running a pharmacy, it is 
particularly essential to indicate a limited partnership, whose exclusion from the 
range of permissible forms of undertaking pharmacy activities may remain the most 
debatable. According to Art. 102 C.c.c. a limited partnership is a partnership aiming 
at running a business under its own name, where at least one partner is liable to the 
creditors for the obligations of the company without restriction (general partner), and 
the liability of at least one partner (limited partner) is limited. A limited partnership 




is a special type of business activity in which the overall decision-making and 
management competencies remain concentrated on the part of the general partner, 
while the function of the other partner (limited partner) is in particular to make a 
specific contribution to the company (monetary or non-monetary), while significant 
limiting its impact on the sphere of company management and conducting its affairs.  
 
It seems, therefore, that the form of a limited partnership, on the one hand, pursues 
the assumptions underlying the statutory limitation of the forms of undertaking 
pharmacy activities, and on the other hand would make a significant contribution to 
the financing of pharmacy activities by the partner in the role of limited partner. 
Obviously, the legitimacy of undertaking pharmacy activities in the form of a 
limited partnership would exist only if the legislator, while allowing such a 
possibility, also took into account the position of a limited partner as not only a 
person with the right to practice as a pharmacist, but also a person not holding such a 
right. Considering the current wording of Art. 99 par. 4 a.p.l. the above 
considerations may be of importance only in the category of conclusions de lege 
ferenda. 
 
In addition, the undertaking of pharmacy activities is limited by statutory specific 
considerations: demographic and geographical, in force from June 25, 2017, 
pursuant to the above-mentioned amendments to the Pharmaceutical Law, and 
conditioning the issuing of permission to operate a pharmacy with regard to specific 
population and location requirements. According to Art. 99, par. 3b, a.p.l. 
permission to operate a generally accessible pharmacy is issued, if on the day of 
submitting the application for the permission the number of inhabitants in a given 
municipality, per one generally accessible pharmacy, is at least 3,000 people and 
distance from the place of the planned location of the pharmacy to the nearest 
functioning generally accessible pharmacy, counted  between the entrances to the 
dispensing areas of pharmacies in a straight line, it is at least 500 meters. The 
number of inhabitants as of the day of submitting the application is determined on 
the basis of current data of the Central Statistical Office.  
 
The obligation of the conjunctive implementation by the applicant of the 
demographic factor and geographical factor, makes  legitimate not only the question 
of the legitimacy of restricting access to the pharmacies market for pharmacists 
intending to undertake to run a pharmacy, but also the question of the impact of the 
indications on the conditions of activity conducted so far. Regardless of the 
assessment or importance of protecting public health, perceived in the public interest 
category, justifies legislative interference, and thus also the state's regulation in the 
structure of the pharmaceutical market so far, to determine the aspect of the location 
of pharmacies, it should be pointed out that the above limitation was introduced 
under the amendment of the Pharmaceutical Law, whose main purpose was to 
strengthen the position of a pharmacist as a participant in the pharmacy market. 
Meanwhile, it seems that there is a kind of paradox in the sphere of the above 
      Protection Guarantee of Public Health in the Functioning of the Pharmaceutical Market 





context. On the one hand, pharmacists have become a legitimate professional group 
authorized on an exclusive basis to undertake new pharmaceutical activities and to 
obtain a permission for running new pharmacies. On the other hand, simultaneously 
introduced restrictions on the location of new pharmacies can significantly reduce 
the importance of the above-mentioned right per facta due to the fact that it can not 
be implemented in the area of a given municipality.  
 
The above conditioning seems to create a specific dissonance between the 
fundamental and legitimate aim of amending Pharmaceutical Law consisting in 
increasing the influence of pharmacists on the pharmaceutical market, and thus on 
the quality of pharmaceutical services and public health protection, and the 
regulations determining the achievement of this goal. It should be recognized that 
the pharmacist's right to undertake pharmacy activities, while strengthening the 
importance and impact of pharmacists' professional group on the pharmaceutical 
market, would be possible to the fullest extent and with the most significant effect, 
in the absence of statutory restrictions on the location of pharmacies. Such 
limitations make the undertaking of pharmacy activities by a pharmacist dependent 
on the existing state of the structure and location of pharmacies in a given 
municipality, shaped by the existing participants of the pharmacy market, which in 
the extreme situation may lead to the inability to open a new pharmacy.  
 
The indicated demographic and geographical limitations may also constitute an 
important factor conditioning the possibility of conducting pharmacy activities 
already carried out. If the entrepreneur running the pharmacy is not also the owner of 
the pharmacy premises, but only has the right to use the premises for the purpose of 
running it (e.g. under a lease agreement), assuming a possible expiration of the 
period of disposing of the right or termination of the contract by the landlord which 
is the basis for administering this right, the requirement to implement the 
demographic and geographical factor may constitute a significant impediment or an 
obstacle to the entrepreneur's continued pursuit of pharmacy activities, e.g. due to 
the inability to open a pharmacy elsewhere.  
 
The obligation to implement the demographic and geographic factor may also have 
an indirect meaning on the basis of negotiation or renegotiation of the contract 
conditions, giving the entrepreneur the right to dispose of the premises for the 
purpose of running a pharmacy (e.g. in the case of expiry of the lease period) 
consisting in weakening the negotiating position of the entrepreneur running the 
pharmacy, for possible inability to run a pharmacy elsewhere. 
 
Considering all the above considerations, it should be recognized that the principles 
of undertaking pharmacy activities shaped by the change of the Pharmaceutical Law 
have an important, but also complex in the context of the overall assessment, impact 
and significance for strengthening the public health protection guarantee in the 
sphere of functioning of the pharmacy market. On the one hand, the adopted 




solutions legitimately promote the position and significance of the pharmacist, as a 
representative of the profession of public trust and the guarantor of public health 
protection, in the field of the pharmaceutical market by giving the pharmacist's 
exclusive right to undertake pharmacy activities and run new pharmacies, on the 
other hand, the introduced solutions seem to tone up the possibility of implementing 
such a right, both on the basis of acceptable forms of undertaking economic activity, 
as well as factors limiting the location of new pharmacies.  
 
As a consequence, the competitiveness of the pharmacist's position in relation to the 
existing and invariably active participants in the pharmaceutical market remains 
within the scope of conditions that seem to measure to some extent the expected 
appreciation and progression of the pharmacist's influence and importance in the 
field of activity of the pharmacy market entities. 
 
4.2 Protection of Public Health in Terms of the Pharmacy Management Model 
 
Running a generally accessible pharmacy constitutes, regardless of the existing 
profile of the ownership structure, running a public health facility. Both in the case 
when the entrepreneur running the pharmacy is a pharmacist, as well as when the 
entrepreneur is an entity not having the right to practice as a pharmacist, running a 
pharmacy is absolutely pre-eminent to achieve the objective of public health 
protection, which is reflected in the statutory determined pharmacy management 
model focused on protecting the interest and the patient's goods. The indicated 
conditioning finds basis in the distinction between the prerogatives of the pharmacy 
owner (i.e. the entrepreneur running the pharmacy), which in particular include the 
duty to properly run a pharmacy expressed in the proper organization of its activity – 
and the prerogatives of the pharmacy manager, which include in particular the work 
organization in the pharmacy.  
 
In the above system of subjective dependencies, the pharmacy manager is important 
from the point of view of the guarantee of protection of public health in the sphere of 
functioning of the pharmacy market. The pharmacy manager may be only a person 
who has the right to exercise the profession of pharmacist and has a specific 
professional work experience in a pharmacy. According to Art. 88 par. 1 and 2 a.p.l. 
a pharmacist must be established in a generally accessible pharmacy, referred to in 
Art. 2b par. 1 point 1, 2 and 5-7 of the Act of 19 April 1991 on Pharmaceutical 
Chambers, responsible for running a pharmacy, whereby you can be the manager of 
only one pharmacy. The pharmacy manager may be a pharmacist who has at least a 
5-year work experience in a pharmacy or a 3-year work experience in a pharmacy if 
they have a specialization in retail pharmacy. 
 
The Constitutional Tribunal drew attention to the special importance of submitting 
professional services rendered by the pharmacy to the prerogatives of people with 
professional qualifications of pharmacists, as guarantors of protection of public 
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health and patient's goods, pointing out that "the very fact that someone may be 
subject to rights and obligations resulting from the economic activity in the form of 
running a pharmacy, cannot conclude that without having specialist knowledge it is 
dangerous for legally protected goods. Such a danger may result only from factual 
activities, and these are strictly regulated and reserved for persons with appropriate 
qualifications in the area of running a pharmacy" (Judgement of the Constitutional 
Tribunal of 20/08/1992).  
 
In turn, the Supreme Administrative Court drew attention to the position and 
function of the pharmacy manager, stressing that "pharmacies conduct activities 
requiring special diligence and high qualifications in the implementation of tasks, as 
negligence resulting from lack of diligence and high qualifications of personnel may 
lead to very serious damages to health, and even to the lives of people using their 
services. Thus, the requirement of constant, ongoing supervision over their activities 
by persons with special qualifications and professional experience is evident." 
(Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 20/02/2019). The above 
position was occupied by the Supreme Administrative Court in a judgement of 
special importance for the pharmacy management model.  
 
In the final judgement, the Supreme Administrative Court settled a legal issue 
regarding the rules of entrusting the replacement of the pharmacy manager, which in 
connection with the validity of the judgement is of preliminary relevance for 
decisions made by other courts in this matter. According to Art. 92 a.p.l. a 
pharmacist should be present during pharmacy activities, mentioned in Art. 88 par. 
1. a.p.l. Referring to this provision, the Supreme Administrative Court pointed out 
that "Art. 92 a.p.l., stating that pharmacist should be present in the pharmacy during 
the pharmacy working hours, mentioned in Art. 88 par. 1 a.p.l., refers not to the 
general notion of a pharmacist resulting from Art. 2b par. 1 point 1, 2 and 5-7 of the 
Act on Pharmaceutical Chambers, but to the one defined in Art. 88 par. 1 a.p.l. of 
the concept of pharmacist responsible for running a pharmacy, that is, one that 
meets the additional requirements in terms of work experience specified in Art. 88 
par. 2 a.p.l. If legislator in Art. 92 a.p.l. was referring to the definition of a 
pharmacist within the meaning of Art. 2 b of the Act on Pharmaceutical Chambers, 
it would refer directly to this provision and not to Art. 88 par. 1 specifying the 
pharmacist responsible for running the pharmacy" (Judgement of the Supreme 
Administrative Court of 20/02/2019).  
 
As a consequence, the Supreme Administrative Court emphasized that the position 
taken was also in accordance with the purposive interpretation of Art. 92 a.p.l. 
indicating that "it should be considered in accordance with the purposive 
interpretation such reading of the content of Art.  92 a.p.l., which implies the 
obligation to ensure the permanent presence in the pharmacy of the pharmacy 
manager within the meaning of Art. 88 par. 1 and 2 a.p.l., or at least another 
pharmacist with competences required from the pharmacy manager" (Judgement of 




the Supreme Administrative Court of 20/02/2019). The final decision is significant 
for the previous interpretation of the provision of Art. 88 par. 1 and 2 in conjunction 
with Art. 92 a.p.l., according to which the replacement of the pharmacy manager for 
a period of up to 30 days could be made to a pharmacist with the right to practice, 
and only in the case of a replacement entrusted for a period longer than 30 days to a 
person with managerial competence under Art. 88 par. 2 a.p.l. - i.e. in accordance 
with § 11 par. 1 of the Ordinance of the Minister of Health of October 18, 2002 on 
basic conditions for running a pharmacy (Journal of Laws of 2002 No. 187 item 
1565). 
 
The decision of the Supreme Administrative Court excludes this kind of subject 
differentiation and obliges the owners of pharmacies to provide the pharmacy with 
the employees meeting the requirements of the presence during the working hours of 
the pharmacy or at least another pharmacist as an assistant manager, however, with 
the same managerial competence as a result of having the required length of work in 
a pharmacy. The indicated resolution of the legal issue of entrusting the replacement 
of the pharmacy manager remains in close correlation with the expected model of 
pharmacy management as a special type of enterprise constituting a public health 
protection facility, and thus fits into the expected dimension of public health 




Actions and interventions on the part of the state, as well as their scope and the 
limits of the public policy are constantly under discussion. It seems that the increase 
in the State’s function in the economy, as expressed in the growing number of 
financial activities and involvement, as well as actions taken in the form of various 
policies, has a quite objective background, showing first and foremost the increasing 
diversity of problems of collective nature. According to W. Parsons, public policies” 
live” thanks to the existence of public problems. If the latter did not exist, there 
would be no reason to pursue policies or concepts of public actions and interventions 
(Parsons, 2005). 
 
Public policy is a term referring to both redistribution policies and regulatory 
policies, to the policies of shaping the institutional structure and the sectoral ones. 
The essence of public policy lies with the combination of legal and regulatory 
instruments, which public administration authorities have at their disposal to 
implement specific actions, with the use of selected tools while maintaining proper 
financing methods. Such a developed and implemented macroeconomic policy 
becomes a basis for executive actions in relation to a particular area of problems, 
where the decisive criterion is the recognition of the public – common – property 
and obtainment of specific social benefits. 
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Macroeconomic policy has close ties with structural policy, the purpose of which is 
to affect the supply-side of the economy, and its full effect will be possible to 
identify only over a longer period. Those areas of State activity are particularly 
important in the period of economic crisis, economic slowdown, and its effects in 
the form of a decrease in production and employment, as well as increase in the 
budget deficit and public debt. Those effects mostly come down to the change of the 
volume and structure of goods and services supply in the economy, the structure of 
incentives affecting the decisions of economic entities, and thereby to the creation of 
conditions favoring a sustainable economic growth.  
 
When determining the scope, form, and goals of activity in individual fields, public 
authorities decide on what particular public tasks, and to what extent, will be 
implemented in a given period and at what level of financial involvement. Those 
initiatives should first and foremost serve to satisfy particular needs of the society, 
according to the adopted political doctrine and the conducted economic and social 
policy. 
 
6. Conclusions, Proposals, Recommendations 
 
Running a generally accessible pharmacy is a special type of economic activity 
shaped on the basis of the duality of objectives, i.e. the objective of protecting public 
health and the economic objective, with the absolute primacy of the public objective. 
The implementation of the public health care facility function by the generally 
accessible pharmacy is in line with the context of public health protection guarantee 
in the field of the functioning of the pharmacy market, both in terms of the principles 
of undertaking pharmacy operations as well as legal solutions that determine the 
pharmacy management model. Particularly noteworthy is a change in the 
Pharmaceutical Law stipulating the right to obtain a permission to operate a 
generally accessible pharmacy exclusively for pharmacists, which despite the 
specific conditions resulting from both limiting the permissible forms of pharmacy 
operations and the implementation of demographic and geographical factors 
determining the acceptability of the pharmacy location, is in essence a change in the 
expected direction and of significant importance for public health protection 
guarantee.  
 
In addition, the statutory submission of the pharmacy management model to the 
distinction of owner prerogatives belonging to the entrepreneur running the 
pharmacy and managerial prerogatives belonging to the pharmacy manager should 
be highlighted, with emphasis on the autonomy and the role of the pharmacy 
manager as the basic guarantor of the objective of public health protection by the 
pharmacy. Therefore, taking into account all legal regulations determining the 
undertaking and performance of pharmaceutical activities, the state of existing legal 
solutions should be considered as providing the basis for a guarantee of public health 
protection in the sphere of functioning of the pharmacy market, whose meaning is 




subject to affirmation in the area of proper observance and application of the 
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